Both are about relationships between principle and agent, such as owners hiring a manager to make decisions.
The agency theory believes that managers if left unattended will make decisions based on self-interest.
In contrast, the stewardship theory believes that if given authority andresponsibility, the agent can act on behalf of the principle.
It is a difference in perspectives, and the result is that companies give high incentives so that managers act in the interests of owners (agency theory)
Stewardship theory is an assumption that managers are stewards whose behaviors coincide with the objectives of their principals. Even if they are left on their own, these stewards will act responsible.
Stewardship theory promotes a culture of trust and responsibility among employees, leading to higher levels of commitment, loyalty, and job satisfaction. It also encourages long-term strategic decision-making over short-term gains, which can benefit the organization's sustainability and success. Additionally, stewardship theory aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, ultimately improving performance and value creation.
Agency theory helps to align the interests of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) by providing incentives for the agent to act in the best interest of the principal. Through mechanisms such as performance-based compensation and monitoring, agency theory aims to reduce agency conflicts and ensure that managers make decisions that maximize shareholder value. Additionally, agency theory provides a framework for understanding the relationships and responsibilities between principals and agents in a business setting.
Agency theory was first articulated by economists Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling in the 1970s. They proposed that conflicts of interest between principals (owners) and agents (managers) could potentially lead to agency problems within organizations.
Agency theory was propounded by economist Michael C. Jensen and legal scholar William H. Meckling. The theory is based on the assumption that conflicts of interest exist between principals (such as shareholders) and agents (such as company executives) due to differing goals and information asymmetry.