How cn u hv a contract with d evils 4 success?

How do you jtag your Xbox?

pre-note: Everything you need to know, my friend did it and it works perfectly, hope you enjoy : )HOWTOFirst, determine your kernel version. This hack has been verified to workuntil the 849x-update (summer 09).Determine your hardware type, which is either a Xenon (no HDMI), Zephyr(HDMI, but 90nmCPU/80nm GPU), Falcon/Opus (60nm CPU) or Jasper (newSouthbridge, 60nm GPU, 60nm CPU).You need some files, which are not part of this package. We are stillworking on proper, legal ways to obtain these files, for example byobtaining them from files you already have (like a NAND backup).What You need- A suitable "CB/CD pack". This is a part of the bootloader, and you need aspecific version for your hardware type:Xenon: 1921Zephyr: 4558Falcon: 5770Jasper: 6712(Especially on Xenon, you might be able to use an older version, too. Butthe newest one will work in any case.)- A hacked SMC code, *for your hardware type*.- Either a Microcontroller doing the JTAG stuff, or a hacked SMC with JTAGcode.- The 4532 kernel update, extracted (you need the xboxupd.bin)- A binutils cross toolchain to target the ppc64 arch- A compiled payload, like XeLL- A possibility to reprogram the NAND flash. You can use an externalprogrammer, a SPI programmer (which will be released soon), or somededicated hardware.Building a suitable imageIn order to produce an image suitable for the attack, let's reconsider whatwe need:- A patches SMC firmware, which starts the CMD 07 "READ SECTOR(S) DMA" atthe right time. Note that you need to use the right SMC based on yourmachine type. Yes, they are all different. Running a pre-jasper code on ajasper-southbridge is particulary difficult to recover from. Be warned.- A microcontroller firmware which does the JTAG thing, implemented as aSMC patch.- A 2BL/4BL combination suitable for your machine type, with version 1920or up.- The 5BL (1888 base kernel), which is always the same binary.- The 4532 (or 4548) patch, extracted from the 4532/4548 system update.- An SMC config block, which stores some boring SMC-related data.- Our exploit buffer, which is DMA'ed into the kernel/HV- The code we want to run (XeLL, for example)The build_image.py can build a flashrom image if you give it the rightitems.example:python build_image.py image_backup.bin input/C{B,D}.1920 input/4532_upd.bininput/xell-backup.bin input/xell-1c.bin input/smc_hacked.binwhere- image_backup.bin is your original nand content,- C{B,D}.1920 are a suitable 2BL/4BL, in decrypted form- 4532_upd.bin is the xboxupd.bin from the 4532 update,- xell-1c.bin and xell-backup.bin are XeLLs linked to 0x01c00000- smc_hacked.bin is the SMC with the hacked read rtc handler (and possiblyalso the jtag stuff)Multiple parts of the image will be generated in the output-directory. Youneed to flash them all, at the proper positions.Flash this images into the 360 NAND flash. Needless to say, MAKE AN UPDATEFIRST! Also, remove R6T3! There is code out which can burn fuses, andpotentially render boxes unusable. By removing R6T3, this won't be an issueanymore. Add the 3 resistors if you want to use the SMC-based JTAG hack.Connect a VGA cable, and power on the box. If you're greeted with a blueXeLL screen, then congratulations, everything is fine! Have fun!SMC GPIOsSo we need some hardware which uses JTAG to set the DMA target address soonin the bootup sequence, as long as JTAG still works. We started using anexternal microcontroller, but we already HAVE an on-board microcontroller -the SMC! There are some leftover GPIO ports, which are - at least onXenon-boards - easily accessible on the left. They operate at 3.3V, so weneed some resistors to handle the 1.8V logic level of the GPU.Zephyr and up don't have so many GPIOs available anymore, but don'tworry, we found a solution there, too.In case you are using the hacked SMC with the GPIO, please use 330 Ohmresistors to connectJ1F1.3 --- [330R] --- J2D2.1J1F1.4 --- [330R] --- J2D2.2J1F1.5 --- [330R] --- J2D2.4How does this all work?To understand this new hack, let's first look at what made the KK exploitpossible: A fatal bug in the Hypervisor's Syscall Handler, introduced in the4532 kernel update.The KK exploit exploited the kernel bug by modifying an unsigned shader todo a series of so-called memory exports, an operation where the GPU canwrite the results of a pixel or vertex shader into physical memory. Theshader was written to overwrite the Idle-thread context to make the kerneljump at a certain position in memory, with some registers under our control.In order to control all registers, a second step was necessary, this time byjumping into the interrupt restore handler. This finally allows allCPU general purpose registers to be filled with determined values. Theprogram counter could be restored to a syscall instruction in the kernel,with register values prefilled so that they would trigger the exploit.The exploit basically allows jumping into any 32-bit address in hypervisor space.To jump into an arbitrary location, we just used a "mtctr, bctr"-registerpair in hypervisor, which would redirect execution flow into any 64-bitaddress. This is important, since we need to clear the upper 32bit (i.e.,set the MSB to disable the HRMO), since the code we want to jump to is inunencrypted memory.This code would usually load a second-stage loader, for example XeLL, intomemory, and start it. XeLL would then attempt to catch all CPU threads(because just the primary thread is affected by our exploit), and load theuser code, for example from DVD.So, the following memory areas are involved:- Idle Thread context, at 00130360 in physical memoryThis stores the stack pointer (and some other stuff) when the idle threadwas suspended. By changing the stack pointer, and then waiting for thekernel to switch to the idle thread, the stack pointer can be brought intoour control. Part of the context switch is also a context restore, based onthe new stack pointer.- Context restore, part 1, arbitrary location, KK expl. uses 80130AF0The thread-context restore doesn't restore all registers, but let's uscontrol the NIP (the "next instruction" pointer). We setup NIP to point tothe interrupt context restore, which does a SP-relative load of mostregisters.- Context restore, part 2, same base location as part 1We just re-use the same stack pointer, because the areas where the firstcontext restore and the interrupt context restore load from do not overlap.The second context restore allows us to pre-set all registers with arbitrary64 bit values.- The HV offset, at 00002080 for syscall 0x46 on 4532Because of the HV bug, we can write this offset into unencrypted memory,giving us the possibility to jump into any location in the hypervisor space(i.e. with a certain "encryption prefix"). We usually write 00000350 here,which points to a "mtctr %r4; bctr" instruction pair in hypervisor, whichlets us jump to %r4.- Our loader code, at an arbitrary locationThis code will be executed from hypervisor. It's the first of our code whichwill be executed. %r4 on the syscall entry has to point to this code.Only the the idle thread context and the HV offset have fixed addresses.It's easily possible to merge this so that only two distinct blocks needs tobe written into memory, but it's not possible to merge this into a singleblock.Fortunately, the NAND controller allows doing DMA reads where the payloaddata is split from the "ECC"-data. Each page has 512 bytes of payload, and16 bytes of ECC data. Thus, a single DMA read can be used to load allrequired memory addresses. We chose the Payload to read the Idle ThreadContext, the Context Restores and the loader code. The ECC data will carrythe HV offset.To to a DMA read, the following NAND registers need to be written:ea00c01c Address for Payloadea00c020 Adresss for ECCea00c00c address inside NANDea00c008 command: read DMA (07)The System Management Controller (SMC) is a 8051 core inside theSouthbridge. It manages the power sequencing, and is always active when theXbox 360 has (standby or full) power applied. It controls the frontpanelbuttons, has a Realtime clock, decodes IR, controls temperatures and fansand the DVDROM tray. It talks with the frontpanel board to set the LEDs.When the system is running, the kernel can communicate with the SMC, forexample to query the realtime clock, open the DVD-tray etc. This happensover a bidirectional FIFO (at ea001080 / ea001090). See the XeLL SMC codefor details.The SMC can read the NAND, because it requires access to a special NAND pagewhich contains a SMC config block. This block contains calibrationinformation for the thermal diodes, and the thermal targets etc. The 8051core has access to NAND registers, which are mapped into the 8051 SFRs. Ituses the same protocol as the kernel uses, so it writes an address, does a"READ" command, and then reads the data out of the "DATA" registers.It could also do a "READ (DMA)"-command. So by hacking the SMC, we couldmake the box do the exploit, without any shader - the SMC can access the NANDcontroller all the time, even when the kernel is running (though it willlikely interfere with the kernel). So, just we just trigger the DMA readwhen the kernel has been loaded, and everything is fine.Right?Well, that would be too easy. While most NAND registers are mapped, tyhe DMAaddress registers (1c, 20) are not. We can DMA, but only to the defaultaddress of zero (or wherever the kernel last DMAed into). Fail.The GPU, the (H)ANA (the "scaler" - which in fact doesn't scale at all, it's"just" a set of DACs, and, since Zephyr, a DVI/HDMI encoder), theSouthbridge and the CPU have their JTAG ports exposed on the board. They areunpopulated headers, but the signals are there. CPU JTAG is a different(complex) story, and SB JTAG doesn't offset much funcationality. ANA JTAG isboring since the ANA doesn't sit on any interesting bus. That leaves GPUJTAG.GPU JTAG was reverse-engineered until a point where arbitrary PCI writes arepossible, up to a certain point. So that makes it possible to talk to eachPCI device in the system, including the NAND controller. So we can simplyuse THAT instead of the SMC to start the DMA?Right?Well, not quite. The problem is that the "VM code", the code which does alot of system initialization, like the memory (that code is also responsiblefor generating the 01xx "RROD"-Errors), sets a certain bit in some GPUregister, which disables the JTAG interface. The VM code is executed waybefore the kernel is active. So this is fail, too.But the combination works - by programming the DMA target address via JTAG,and launching the attack via SMC. The attack can be launched as soon as thekernel is running, and quite early, it does query the SMC for the RTC. Weabuse this call to start the attack instead, which is a perfect point forus.But how do we run an exploitable kernel at all? Most machines are updatedalready. Let me refresh your knowledge about the boot process again:1BL (Bootrom)Buried deep inside the CPU die, this ~32kb of ROM code is responsible forreading the 2BL from NAND-flash and decrypts it into the embedded SRAM in theCPU. It verifies the hash of the decrypted image with a signed block at thebeginning of the 2BL, and will stop execution of this hash mismatches. Thiscode also contains a number of test functions, which can be activated bypulling the 5 "POST IN"-pins, which are available on the backside of thePCB. None of these tests looks particulary interesting (from an exploitationperspective) - they mostly seem to be related to the FSB (the bus betweenCPU and GPU). This code is fixed, and all systems use identical code here.2BL ("CB")This code is usually located at 0x8000 in NAND flash. It's decrypted by 1BL,and runs from internal SRAM.It does a basic hardware initialization, and contains the "fuse check code",which verifies the "2BL version". The fuses store the expected version.The 2BL stores a "Version" and a "AllowedMask" (=bitfield), andthis is usually stored at address 0x3B1 / 0x3B2..0x3B3.Xenon Zephyr Falcon Jasper2 0003 1888, 1901, 19024 1920 "new zeropair code"5 0010 1921 4558 5760,5761,5770 6712 TA-fixedIt then verifies the pairing information stored in the 2BL header. Part ofthis verification is a checksum check of the NAND area which was used toload the SMC code from.It also contains a virtual machine and somecode to run on this machine. The virtual machine code, which is prettycomplicated, does the following things:- Initialisation of the PCI-Bridge- Disable the GPU PCIE JTAG test port- initialize the serial port- talk to the SMC to clear the "handshake"-bit- initialize memory- hopefully not: generate RROD if memory init failsAfter that, the external (512MB) memory will be initialized and usable. 2BLthen decrypts the 4BL into this memory. Memory encryption will already beenabled - no executable code is *ever* written unencrypted.4BL ("CD")This code is responsible for checking and unpacking 5BL, as well as applyingupdate patches. First, the fuses are read to determine the console "UpdateSequence", a number which basically counts the number of updates installed.Since updates are, in the same way as 2BL, paired to a console, this allowsto configure the console in a way that no old update will be used. So eachupdate slot stores the maximum value of burned fuses (well, essentially theexact value). The base kernel also has an associated value, usually zero,but this can be changed in the 2BL pairing data block. This is what thetiming-attack increments, in order to revert to the 1888 kernel.5BL ("HV/Kernel")The HV and kernel are merged into a single image, which is compressed with aproprietary algorithm (LDIC).6BL ("CF"), 7BL ("CG")This is part of a system upgrade. Each console has a so-called "BaseKernel", which is the 1888 kernel which was available on launch back in2005. Then there are two "update slots" - areas of 64k each (128k onJasper), which contain a 6BL and 7BL. 6BL is code which applies theupdate, using a clever delta-compression. 7BL is the actual delta-compressedupdate, essentially a binary diff.Oh, updates are >64k. So only the first 64k are actually stored in theupdate slots, the rest is stored in the filesystem as a special file. Since6BL doesn't contain a filesystem parser, a blockmap is added in 6BL whichpoints to the sectors which contain the rest of the update.Zero-PairingNow there is a special situation: If the 2BL pairing block is all-zero, thepairing block will not be checked. However, a bit is set so that the kerneldoesn't boot the dashboard binary, but a special binary called"MfgBootLauncher", where "Mfg" probably stands for "Manufacturing". So thisis a leftover of the production process, where the flash image is used onall hardware, probably also before any CPU-key has been programmed.By abusing this feature, this allows us easily to produce a flash imagewhich runs on all hardware. However, 4BL won't look at update slots when itdetects this mode, so we end up in the 1888 base kernel. And we can't runthe dashboard, so it's impossible to escape this mode.Previously, this has been deemed very uninteresting, because first the 1888isn't exploitable by the KK exploit, and second because it's impossible torun the KK game anyway.However, starting with 2BL version 1920, an interesting thing happened:The encryption key for 4BL is generated with the help of the CPU-key now.That means that without the CPU-key, it's not possible to decrypt the 4BLanymore. Note that each 2BL has exactly a single valid 4BL binary - 2BLcontains a hardcoded hash for the 4BL, and doesn't use RSA.However, zero'ed pairing data is detected, the CPU-key is NOT used in thisprocess, like it was previously. That also means that you cannot just zero-outthe pairing data anymore - the 4BL would be decrypted with the wrong keythen. Instead you need to decrypt the 4BL (which requires knowing the CPUkey), and re-encrypt it with the old algorithm.However, 1920 was suspecible to the timing attack - so a CPU-key recoverywas possible on one console, which allowed us to decrypt the 1920 4BL. That4BL shows a very intersting change: Whenever zero-pairing is detected, theupdate slots are not ignored anymore. Instead, if the update-slots arezero-paired as well, they are applied.This change allows us to boot any kernel, provided we have a (1920 and up)2BL/4BL set which runs on that machine. This is very important, because wecan build up an image now which runs into the 4532 kernel, regardless on howmany update fuses are set. However, the 2BL revocation process must bepassed, so we are not completely independent of the fuses, still. But sincewe use zero-pairing, the SMC hash doesn't matter anymore (there are otherways to work around the SMC hash problem, like the TA, but we get this forfree). Still, we boot into the MfgBootLauncher (into the 4532 version now,which does a red/green blinking thingie - you'll notice once you see it,it's very unique and doesn't look like any RROD or so). But thanks to theSMC/JTAG hack described above, this allows us to launch our attack from thisstate.Newer consoles (which have the TA fix) don't run 1920 anymore. They run, forexample, 1921. The problem is that we cannot run HV code on these machines,so we don't know the CPU key. However, when comparing the 1921 and 1920 2BL(which we can still decrypt), the only change is the addition of the timingattack fix (i.e. replacing two memcmp instances with a memdiff function).Also, we know the expected hash value of the decrypted 4BL. Based on a 19204BL, and the guess what has changed functionally, and the new size of the4BL, we were able to guess the modifications, which yields an image whichpasses the 2BL hash check. Note that this is not a hash collision - we didmerely derive the exact image by applying the changes between 1920 2BL and 19212BL into 1920 4BL, yielding the 1921 4BL.The 1921 2BL theoretically runs on all machines so far, even TA-proof ones.But it crashes on Zephyr, Falcon and Jasper. The reason is the VM code,which doesn't cover the different GPUs (Xenon has 90nm GPU, Zephyr andFalcon have 80nm, Jasper has 60nm, so there are 3 GPU revisions in total).But the step from 1921 to, say, 4558, is even smaller. It's just thedifferent version number, plus a slight difference in the memcpy code, whichagain can be ported over from 2BL.Jasper's 67xx is a different thing, since this code adds support for thelargeblock flash used in "Arcade"-Jasper units. We have used some magic toretrieve this code.So we now have ALL 4BL versions. Isn't that great? It means that ALLmachines can run the 4532 kernel. The good news is also that the 4532 kernelsupports falcon consoles, and runs long enough to also work on jasperconsoles (because we exploit way before the different GPU is touched atall).TroubleshootingQ: "The power supply goes red when plugging in power!"A: You shorted a power pin, probably V33_SB, the one attached to the NANDflash. Carefully look for solder residues. Use a lot of flux and aproperly-heated soldering iron.Q: "The power supply stays yellow when I press the power button, and nothingelse happens."A: The SMC code is invalid. This can be a misconnected flashrom, an illegalimage, a bad flash or simply a bad SMC code.Verify:- Electrical connections first.- Did you flash with the proper ECC settings? The flash images we areworking with usually contain raw ECC information, i.e. 512+16 bytes persector. Make sure your flash programmer is not modifying these 16bytes, but writing those as they are.- Have you used the right SMC image?Q: "The fans run at full speed immediately."A: This is very likely a bad SMC config sector. Did you flash all the partsgenerated by the image creation tool at the proper position?Note that offsets are given as payload offsets, not counting ECC bytes.Usually this matches what your average NAND programmer tells you, but incase you re-assembled these into a single image, take care to properlyconvert the offsets.Q: "I get E79"A: This means that, congratulations, your console is still booting into akernel, and just cannot go further (which was to be exepcted, given thatthere is no filesystem anymore).You're almost there, but for some reasons, the DMA attack didn't run.This can be either that you didn't used a patched SMC, or that the targetaddress wasn't inserted properly.Q: "Console powers on, but I get a black screen."A: Well, there are many reasons here again. First, wait some time (~1minute), and see if you get a RROD. If you do, the VM code failed tohandshake with the SMC (error code XXXX), which usually means that itcrashed, and the SMC watchdog triggered until it retried too often.Did you use the proper 2BL/4BL image for your machine type? Did you use arecent enough SMC version? Since the VM code took more and more time(from roughly a half second in 1888 to several seconds in 1920), the SMCcode was modified to time out later. Be sure to use a known-good SMCversion, if possible, based on the version which was installed before.If you don't get a RROD, please try checking your POST code. You can dothis via CPU jtag, or by measuring the 8 POST pins.Post code 6C:The exploit failed, somehow.Post code 10:Our code is running! That's great, but it failed copying the XeLL-payloadfrom flash. Try booting into the alternate loader (see below in the"exploit loader" section), or reflash.Post code 11:Exploit code ran, and jumped into XeLL. XeLL crashed. Try alternateloader, or do serial upload for recovery, if you really screwed up both theprimary and secondary loader. (You failed, in that case.)Post codes >= 0x80:Those are errors from the bootloader. Please check the disassembly ofthose loaders to see what's wrong exactly. It shouldn't happen unless youhave a bad flash.Post code 0xA0:Your 2BL didn't want to run on your hardware due to the 2BL revocationfuses. Use a more recent 2BL/4BL set for your hardware. If you're alreadyrunning {1921, 4558, 5770, 6712} then you're out of luck. Your box wasalready updated to a newer 2BL, which likely fixed what we used toexploit. Restore R6T3, restore the flash image, and use this console forplaying games. Get another console, and try again.Please note that some hardware elements are not properly initialized at theearly time of the exploit. This affects:CPU:- The CPU is initialized in low-power mode, where it runs at quarter-speed.Setting the CPU power mode is possible, of course, but needs to bereverse-engineered from the corresponding hypervisor syscall.GPU:- A full screen setup is required, including the programming of theANA-chip. Code is available for setting up a 640x480 VGA mode, supportfor other resolutions needs to be added.- EDRAM must be "trained". This is what fails when the E-74 error isdisplayed. The code is rather complex, and has beenreverse-enginnered, but doesn't run properly yet. However, it has beenshown to work a bit, and can likely be tweaked to work properly.SATA:- SATA likely needs some reset sequence. Linux kernel does this fine, butXeLL doesn't work.All of these issues are expected to be fixed.This hack can also be used to reboot into a Microsoft kernel, in order to keep thepossibility of playing games locally. This is not within the scope of thisdocument, and is actually not related to this hack at all. This hack allowsyou the execution of software - and YOU decide what software that should be.It could be Linux, your favourite emulator, or a rebooter.Note that we do not support patching the Microsoft kernel for piracyunder any circumstances. Also, playing on LIVE with a modified consolewon't be possible without getting banned, ever. There are alreadychallenges in place which detect any unauthorized modification. We urge youto not abuse this hack for piracy.EXPLOIT LOADERThe first own code which is executed is a small loader, which operates inthe following way:- If a character is present on the serial port, it will be read.- if that character is '@', we will enter serial upload mode.- if that character is ' ', we will use the backup bootloader- if not serial upload mode:- POST 0x10- read bootloader from flash (either backup or normal)- POST 0x11- run- serial upload mode:- output '>'- receive characters- after 10 consecutive 'x', stop upload- output '!'- runThis allows some kind of recovery if you want to update the in-flashbootloader.The used addresses are the following:FLASH_BASE is the location in flash of the backup bootloader,FLASH_BASE + 0x40000 is the location of the main bootloader,CODE_BASE is the memory address of the bootloader in ram.By default, the following memory map is used:00000000..00100000: SMC, KV, CB, CD, CE, CF, CG, backup bootloader00100000..00140000: main bootloader00140000..00f7c000: empty space00f7c000 : smc config block00ffc000 : exploit bufferBut this can be tweaked.

How cn u hv a contract with d evils 4 success?

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